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The Thrust of Tort Law

Part II
Judicial Law Making*
LEON GREEN**

By the time legislation in the tort area came to the fore, the
functions of the courts in tort law development were well established.
Even later in some jurisdictions where legislatures undertook to
codify the law they did little more than write into statute the product
of the courts, leaving to them its further development. Also when
legislatures have undertaken new areas of tort law they have done
little more than designate the directions, leaving to the courts the
expansion and limitation of the remedies made available. More often
than not legislative action in the tort field has been the result of
default by the courts in meeting some pressing problem of wide
implications, as for example, the recognition of an action for death,'
the survival of the personal injury action,2 the refusal or inability
to simplify the action by an employee for personal injury against
his corporate employer,' and the excessive use of injunctions against
labor unions.'
COURTS V. LEGISLATURES

In recent years the power of the courts to make, unmake and
remake tort law without legislative sanction has come in question.
* This article was originally delivered as the second of the Edward G.
Donley Memorial Lectures of 1961. The concluding lecture of the series will

appear in the April issue of the Review.
** Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Texas.
PROSSER, TORTS 705 et seq. (2d ed., 1955).
2
Ibid.
3
Id., at 373, 382, 386.

4 Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 U.S.C. § 102, 47 Stat. 70 (1932).
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This is due in part to the decisions removing restrictions and limitations placed by the courts on themselves during the 1800's when
all tort liability was reduced to a minimum.' Their difficulties have
been magnified by the doctrine of stare decisis so frequently urged
as a block to the solutions of the numerous new problems which
continue to arise.' The power of the courts to free themselves from
their past decisions and to fashion law for today and tomorrow is
further complicated by the fact that redesigning the law has become
such a stupendous undertaking with so many unanticipated consequences that many judges hesitate to enter upon the case-by-case
labor when it is so easy to call upon legislatures to lay out the
way for the courts. This attitude finds great support among lawyers
and the populace generally, partly because of the interests of clients
who are fully satisfied to leave things as they are, and partly because
of the philosophy that it is the courts' function to declare and administer the law as it is found, but is no part of their functions to
make new law-a philosophy developed by the courts themselves
as a protection against political attack. Thus it is that we hear
much about "judicial legislation," sometimes from judges themselves,
and witness much flaying of the courts by the profession for their
departures from what is asserted to be the well-established law of
the land. The courts will be pressed more and more to exercise
their power to extend and modify their doctrinal controls as a
5

See the enlightening opinion of Smith, J., dealing with the issue of

damages in Wycko v. Gnoldlke, 361 Mich. 331, 105 N.W.2d 118 (1960);

and see, Muskopf v. Coming Hospital Dist., 11 Cal. Rep. 89, 359 P.2d 457
(Sup. Ct. 1961).
( The literature on the subject is abundant and it overwhelmingly points
in one direction. Each writer, however, adds something distinctive. WiMORE,
PROBLEMS IN LAW ch. 2 (1920); ALLEN, LAW IN THE MAKING, 126 et seq.
AN UNWARRENTABLE INTERVENTION, 51 L.Q.
(1926); ALLEN, CASE LAW:
REv. 333 (1935); CARDozo, THE NATUn OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 131
et seq. (1921); CARDozo, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW, ch. 1 (1924); Douglas,
Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 735 (1949); HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW,

36 (1881); HOLMES, THE PATH OF THE LAW (1897); HOLMES, COLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS 181 (1920); Jackson, Decisional Lmv and Stare Decisis, 30
A.B.A.J. 334 (1944); POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW (1921);

Pound, The Theory of Judicial Decision, 36 HARV. L. REv. 302 (1923);
POUND, THE FORMATnvE ERA OF AMERICAN LAW chs. 1, 3 (1938); Salmond,
The Theory of Judicial Precedents, 16 L.Q. Rnv. 376 (1900); Schaefer,
Precedent and Policy (Ernst Freund Lecture, University of Chicago Law
School 1955); Green, The Development of the Doctrine of Stare Decisis and
the Extent to Which It Should Be Applied, 40 ILL. L. REv. 303 (1946);
Hardman, Stare Decisis and the Modern Trend, 32 W. VA. L. Q. 163 (1926);
Davis, The Doctrine of Precedent as Applied to Administrative Decisions, 59
W. VA. L. REv. 111 (1957); LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION

(1961); Levy, Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. PA.
L. REv. 1 (1960).
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multitude of new problems arise from the revolutionary environment
now in the making. And if they respond, the clamor of usurpation
of legislative power and for legislative restraints on the courts will
increase. It would thus seem timely to give thought to the respective
functions of courts and legislatures to refashion and modify tort law.
To speak of "judicial legislation" is either a mere figure of
speech, or more likely, a slur on the court itself or its decision. A
court cannot legislate in deciding a case any more than a legislature
can render a judicial decision in enacting a statute. This does not
mean that courts do not make law, for they have made the great
bulk of tort law and legislatures have made comparatively very
little. The two law-making processes have little in common. The
judicial process is day-to-day, a case here and a case there, with
a minimum of hurry and a maximum of deliberateness, under the
control of sober-minded and highly trained men of experience in
the law, with a specific controversy before them, brought under
the glare of the wisdom of the past and the headlights of the future,
and seeking a reasonable adjustment between the litigants consistent
with the interests of the rest of us.
The legislative process is so unlike this that it is difficult to
discover similarities. Both deal with problems but the problems
have different dimensions-one highly particularized, the other highly
generalized. Legislators may be dedicated, scholarly, unhurried men,
but such men are not found in large numbers in any legislative
body. More frequently they are politically-minded men harried by
political considerations. Partisanship and the interests of a particular
constituency are large factors in any important matter. Taxes, budgets,
appropriations, schools, elections, highways, natural resources, eleemosynary institutions, criminal law, departmental investigations, resisting the demands of strong interests and their lobbyists, and scores
of other pressures leave legislators no time and no disposition to
consider the problems of tort law unless a bill is brought readymade and sponsored by a group or groups with great political power.'
And even then, if strong opposition appears, the bill is lost in some
7See
PEDiuCy, ON CVIL'NG THE LAW OF TORTS (1961) for a graphic
study of legislative productivity of tort law. Weber, Guest Statutes, 11 U.
CiNc. L. REv. 24 (1937); Notes, 1 Wyo. L.J. 182 (1947), 3 Wyo. L.J. 225
(1949). Feinsinger, Legislative Heart Balm Statutes, 33 MIcH. L. REv. 979
(1935); Magierowski v. Buckley, 39 N.J. Super. 534, 121 A.2d 749 (1956).
Retraction and other libel statutes generally are the products of newspaper
lobbies.
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one or more of the many deviations that beset legislative procedures.'
The legislative way is not designed and has little competence to deal
with tort problems unless the relief sought is merely to open a new
field for the courts, and/or is tied to some more important matter
as was true of the Federal Tort Claims Act which had bounced
around in congressional committee hearings for many sessions until
a friendly Attorney General made it a part of a Reorganization Act
of 1946,1 destined to become law in absence of congressional veto
within a limited period. We cannot dismiss the attacks upon the
power of courts to fashion law as something unimportant. The
problem is an old one and will persist. Let us turn to a more careful
examination of the courts' competence for the making of tort law,
and by doing so indicate more specifically the inadequacy of the
legislative process to perform this function.
The policies of the tort law of the last century were staked
out, its doctrines formulated and its remedial limits set during the
struggle for economic stability of a new country. Little grumbling
was heard concerning the power the courts were exercising in the
development of substantive law but there was wide dissatisfaction
with the restrictions imposed by common law and equity procedures.
The forms of action and common law pleading were superseded
by code pleading and great changes made in court organization and
trial procedures. While the procedures were largely the work of the
legislatures, the courts supplied the substantive core of tort law
through actions of trespass, negligence, nuisance, deceit, libel, conversion, a group of actions for the protection of the family and a
wholly new group of actions for the protection of trade through
legal and equitable remedies. Some of these actions were nothing
more than the offspring of the actions of trespass and case but the
abolition of the forms of pleading gave them freedom for new
growth more responsive to the problems and needs of the times.
During most of this period the growth and expansion of defenses
to liability were luxuriant. Many immunities were grafted on tort
law. It became difficult to conduct a case to judgment without
error. The dockets of the appellate courts became crowded with
cases from the trial courts and doctrinal snares and tangles required
much writing and clarification.
8 See Leflar and Kantrovitz, Tort Liability of the States, 29 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1363 (1954). State Tort Claims Acts are introduced in successive sessions
of many state legislatures but seldom get out of committee.
9 Dalhite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
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When in the late 1800's the courts began to be called upon to
reconsider the restrictions, limitations, and immunities imposed in
earlier cases, and to extend the reach of tort law to the numerous
hurts resulting from the mechanized activities of an exceedingly industrious people, great professional murmuring began to rise. Courts
relaxed their restrictive doctrines slowly and the tempo of relaxation
has not yet reached its climax. When the courts refused to take
further steps, as for example, in not removing their restrictions
placed on death and survival statutes, the legislatures sometimes
stepped in and amended the statutes. Statutes were enacted for
the protection of the interests of married women.'" Dram shop
acts were passed for the protection of the family and for the merchants
who supplied the family with clothing and groceries." Fence and
other specific laws were enacted for the protection of landowners.
Statutes regulating the operations of railroads were enacted for the
protection of highway travelers. For most part these and other
legislative acts were sketchy and fragmentary but they served to
open the doors of the courthouse and swell the rising tide of litigation. Still, most courts applied the same restrictive doctrines to
legislation that they did to their own court-made law.
The most radical legislative interposition in tort law on the
American scene came early in this century to clear away the restrictive doctrines developed by the courts in the industrial employeremployee cases and to replace them with workmen's compensation
and employers' liability acts. 2 Many judges and many practitioners
were greatly peeved by this loss and impairment of court jurisdiction,
as they were later when so many important problems were brought
under the New Deal administrative agencies. Generally it can be
said that the courts were slow to remove the fetters they had fastened
on themselves and on the tort law of the 1800's so that it could
be an effective instrument in meeting the problems of the current
period, and in retrospect, they seem to have resented the little assistance the legislatures gave them in liberalising tort doctrine. In
fact, it required an extended period of legal education and the
passing of several generations of professional and judicial personnel
to reach the present level of tort law.
10 Prosser, op. cit. supra note 1 at 672.
"1Joyce v. Hatfield, 187 Md. 249, 78 A.2d 754 (1951); Symposium,
Actions Under the Illinois Dram Shop Act (1958) U. ILL. L.F. 175-284;
Note, 2Illinois Dram Shop Act, 51 Nw. U, L. RaV. 775 (1957).
1 PRossER, op. cit. supra note 1 at 382.
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It can now be said with some assurance that our courts are
in a position to exercise their function of keeping tort law more
nearly responsive to the social and economic environments as they
are ushered in by the life about us. Their apparatus is extensive,
their personnel is trained by schooling and experience, and they
are served by a profession of able advocates. Their organization
is becoming more and more integrated into systems superintended
by the administration of judges expert in getting the work load of
the courts done more promptly. The development of procedures
for preparation of cases for trial, the trial itself and review by appellate courts have been handed back by the legislatures to the
courts themselves under their rule-making power, and the courts in
turn have enlisted and received the assistance of practitioners and
committees of the associations of the bar in developing procedures
suited to the effective administration of the courts' business.
The trial of a case continues to be the hub of the judicial
process in tort cases; the development of the facts of the transaction
in litigation the most treacherous phase of trial; the instructions to
the jury the most fertile source of formal errors. The pitfalls of
fact determination so vividly described by the late Judge Jerome
Frank in his little volume Courts on Trial are constantly being reduced in number and in their capacity to render a trial a fiasco.
This is due to many factors, the most important perhaps are the
control the judge may exercise through pre-trial proceedings, the
great facilities the lawyers have for producing evidence by thorough
investigation, by expert witnesses and by scientific methods. It is
enough to say that aside from many of the tragic highway and
skyway collisions which defy unravelling by expert or layman, the
facts of most of the tort cases brought to trial can be determined
with considerable accuracy. The hazard of swearing matches between partisan, excited, and sometimes untruthful, witnesses, however, can never be entirely removed.
Assuming that the facts of a tort case can be ascertained
with approximate certainty, the controlling law will usually yield to
careful research. Any different interpretation of the facts will, of
course, call for different alignment of law, and if several interpretations may be made, the choice of law is always influenced by the
result the interpreter is convinced should be reached. Tort cases
frequently give rise to important questions of policy though the
policy is infrequently made explicit. It is the decision of these cases
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which challenge the law-making power of courts. Judge Cardozo
could find such a challenge in what seemed to be very simple cases. 3
Other judges may have a case involving challenge to the highest
intellectual and creative talent and treat it with yawning routine.
This leads me to say, as with all artists, more depends upon what
the judge brings to his work than upon the material he works with.
It is in the treatment of cases involving questions of policy that courts
have achieved their greatest successes and have suffered their greatest
failures. It is also here that the clamor is raised for legislative
supremacy and abdication by the courts of their creative power.
We inquire which process, judicial or legislative, offers more of
justness and fairness for the litigant, more capable administration
for a more stable society. It is frequently said-often by the courts
themselves-that some problem-usually one on which they have
defaulted-is for the legislature; that the court is in no position to
make the investigations necessary for an informed judgment, and
that the legislature can shape the law more nicely to meet the
problem. Courts may say this even in cases in which they have
rendered some legislative act abortive and all they need do is to
remove their restrictive interpretation, 4 or in other cases in which
no legislative act is involved but only the court's own obsolete rule
or doctrine." I doubt seriously that these excuses can be sustained.
It is my conviction that there is no more reliable source of tort law
than the court which is faced with the problem. The courts know
more of the history of the law and what is involved in any departure from established rule than legislatures know or can find out.
They have more time and are better equipped for a problem's study.
They have adversary counsel upon whom they may rely to explore
the facts and the law and the difficulties to be encountered in the
future. Where counsel fall short the judges may call upon their
13 Hynes v. New York Cent R.R., 221 N.Y. 229, 131 N.E. 898, 17
A.L.R. 803 (1921); Wagner v. International Ry. 232 N.Y. 176, 133 N.E.
437, 10 A.L.R. 1 (1921); Morning Star v. Lafayette Hotel Co., 211 N.Y.
465, 105 N.E.2 656 (1914). I have dealt with the matter of policy in two
brief articles, Tort Law Public Law in Disguise, (pts. 1-2), 38 TEXAs L. Rnv.
1, 257 (1959-60).
14This was true with respect to death and survival acts, notes 1 and 2,
supra.
'- City & County of Denver v. Madison, 142 Colo. 1, 351 P.2d 826
(1960); Muller v. Nebraska Methodist Hospital, 160 Neb. 279, 70 N.W.2d
86 (1955); Livingston v. Regents, 64 N.M. 306, 328 P.2d 78 (1958). Cf.,
Noel v. Menninger Foundation, 175 Kan. 751, 267 P.2d 934 (1954); Bing
v. Thunig, 2 N.Y.2d 656, 163 N.Y.S.2d 3, 143 N.E.2d 3 (1957); Parker v.
Port Huron Hospital, 361 Mich. 1, 105 N.W.2d 1 (1960); Pierce v. Yakama
Valley Memorial Hospital Ass'n, 43 Wash. 2d 167, 260 P.2d 765 (1953).
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clerks. The manner in which the problem or some similar problem
has been met by other courts is on record and is more likely to
be given thorough study by a court. Factual studies of the social
and economic implications are usually available. Judges are less
partisan and less influenced by purely political considerations. They
are freer from pressures of parties, groups, and friends, and their
decisions are seldom laden with political consequences as are the
acts of legislatures. They have the power and facilities of exposition at their command, under caution imposed by threatened or
actual dissent by those from their own ranks. They decide a single
case and in subsequent cases they have the power to modify their
course or to reverse it altogether if convinced their course is erroneous or ill-advised. Their judgment may be as restricted as they
desire.
On the other hand, a statute is a formal declaration that must
be given meaning and usually must be lived with a long time before
its scope is fully defined, and before it can be modified. If accepted
literally its coverage is usually either too broad or too narrow.
Usually a statute is ambiguous and must be given meaning from
case to case much in the same manner that a court gives meaning
to its own rule or doctrine. If this is the process the court does
everything except take the political responsibility for a statutory
departure. As a matter of fact, legislatures seldom step in either
to modify or extend tort law even when a court refuses to reject
some antiquated doctrine, but leave the courts to their own resources.
On the other hand, the courts may and do make great use of criminal
statutes and police regulations either directly or by way of analogy
as a base for civil liability.16 Some years ago the New York legislature was prevailed upon to set up a commission to study decisional
law for situations which required legislative correction. The commission has made numerous studies and proposals but few have
been acted on. Indeed, the courts seem to have been more influenced to action by the exposure of their errors and shortcomings than have the legislature. Legislatures realize, as do
most lawyers, that except for radical changes in far-reaching policy,
the best tort law is judge-made law and judges should not be encouraged to shirk their responsibility to keep tort law in tune with
16Rudes v. Gottschalk, 159 Tex. 552, 324 S.W.2d 201 (1959); Davis,
West Virginia Negligence Cases and the Legislative Standards of Conduct, 61
W. VA. L. REv. (1958); Morris, The Role of Criminal Statutes in Negligence
Actions, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 21 (1948).
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the times, and especially should not be encouraged to rely on the
legislature to do their house-cleaning."
CONTROLS

Let us assume that tort law has been and still is primarily the
product of the judicial process; that it has followed the environmental changes of the past with considerable fidelity; that at no
time is it static but is constantly being pushed forward or backward by the crush of events; and that it always presents a jagged
front of movement if not of progress. Let us further assume that
"laymen in some degree sense the fact that courts somehow make
law; that the profession fully recognizes the fact and that judges
with varying degrees of enthusiasm accept law-making and remaking
as one of their important functions. On the basis of these assumptions what controls the exercise of this function by the courts?
What determines the limits of the courts' power, since they themselves must sit in final judgment on what they do? These questions
have concerned the students of the common law and of its judges
for a long time.
CREATIVENESS AND STARE DEcIsIS

As already has been stated, judges frequently deny that courts
have the power to make law, and have asserted that the courts'
function is to decide a case and declare the law that controls the
decision; that judges may find the law but they do not make law.
How much of this attitude reflects defensive coloration, how much
is semantics, and how much honest belief cannot be known. Sometimes we think we detect the tongue in the cheek; sometimes the
protests are so violent that we are reminded of Shakespeare's lady.
But giving the judges credit for a deep sense of innocence we suggest
that no case can be decided without making law. The making of
a decision of necessity means the making of law whether it is the
result of statutory construction or the product of reasoning from
precedent or principle. If the case involves some new problem its
decision settles the dispute and at the same time creates a precedent
17
See, Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ili.2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960); Pedrick,
op. cit. supra note 7. Professor Clarence Morris, "If and when justice requires
a change in the law that a court can make without violating the traditions of
judicial law making, the power and ability of the legislature to make the same
change are irrelevant-because the court cannot know whether or when the
legislature will act, and because the court's change is unlikely to embarrass
legislative action if and when the legislature decides to take action." (unpublished memorandum)
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which will influence decisions in other cases, and these in turn will
become precedents themselves which will influence the decisions of
still other cases to follow. The ultimate reproductive capacity of
judicial decision may be as far-reaching and as explosive as the
seeds of plant and animal life, but no two specimens will be identical.
There are always similarities and also differences in any two decisions
dealing with the same or similar problems. Whether a particular
decision is utilized to support or not support a subsequent decision
will depend upon the emphasis given the similarities or differences
by the court deciding the subsequent case. This permits judge and
advocate to "roll their own" precedents as was once the practice
with cigarettes, or they may allow some expert to roll them as is
the practice now. But whether they roll their own or choose an
expert's brand the precedent will serve the end desired. The creativeness of the judicial process is inevitable and unavoidable even though
a court may explicitly limit a decision to the peculiar facts of the
case before it as is sometimes done. A court may deliberately
regiment a vast array of former decisions of marginal, if any, bearing
at all, to support and justify a decision believed to mark a new
course.' 8 In fact, in nearly all cases in which a court undertakes
to mark a departure and lay out a new course it will find support
in former cases, sometimes as precedents but more frequently as
recognizing the principle on which the departure is based. By the
same process a court may wholly reject or overrule its former decisions which obstruct the new path the court would mark. 9 The
techniques of the courts for reaching the ends of law in the particular
case are so numerous that they cannot be successfully enumerated
-so numerous and sometimes so subtle that no court can be fenced
in if it is master of the common law tradition.20
8
1 A good example of the practice is found in Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
19 See, Muskopf v. Corning Hospital Dist, supra note 5; Keyes v. Construction Service Co., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960); Woods v.
Lancet, 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951); Commonwealth v. Ladd,
402 2Pa.
0 164, 166 A.2d 501 (1961).
How flexible and how comprehensive the common law tradition is has
been meticulously explored and recorded by Professor Karl Llewellyn in his
recent book: The Common Law Tradition (Deciding Appeals) (1960). The
book came to me after this series of discussions had been given form. I
added the last sentence in the text above in order to drop this footnote.
Had the book been published earlier I should have noted it many times,
with excerpts. It gives more support to many of my statements than I have
found elsewhere, and goes leagues beyond. The supporting data given by the
author have great breadth and depth, and sometimes it seems would well
support some other or even an opposite conclusion than that reached by him.
This only indicates that he wrestled with tough angels.
The book has many themes and sub-themes and could not be summar-
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The doctrine of stare decisis is sometimes thought to be the
opposite pole to creativeness. Stare decisis is essentially an administrative policy argument, namely, that a court should not depart
from its former decisions because they give stability, predictability
and justness of decision, and are of great importance as a means
of control by the supreme court of the courts below. It is an argument of great weight but it in nowise impairs the courts' creative
function. At most it simply influences a court to adhere to the
same pattern it has already created. Even for this desirable purpose
it is illusory. Life cannot be made to stand still; it will break out
of any rule that can be formulated. Stare decisis is inevitably undermined by its own force. Assume that what is thought to be the
holding or the principle of a case is followed in several subsequent
cases; each case will differ, if only slightly from the case that is
followed. As restatements of a rule or doctrine are accommodated
to new facts the original rule will be swallowed up in interpretations
and refinements and may lose its integrity. Its offspring will become
precedents in their own right but for different holdings and they
in turn will suffer the same fate. It is most remarkable how older
precedents fade out and new generations of precedents take their
place until advocates and judges may find in the libraries support
for any position that justice, as they conceive, commands them to
take. Stability and justice are viewed differently from different sides
of the counsel table, and from the bench above as well. They do
and must rest on much firmer foundations than past decisions or
any principle that may be deduced from them. They need not interfere with the growth of law or with the courts' law-making function.
Instead, they are the reinforcing factors of both. The surest means
of rendering law unstable and unjust is the adherence to precedents
which have died on the vine and it is as much the function of courts
to remove them from the law as it is to make new precedents.

ized in brief space. The conclusion that interests me at this juncture I doubt
the author would accept, namely, that the courts have at their command
numerous techniques which may be legitimately used to reach what they
deem to be the just and practical solution of any problem submitted to them
through the litigation process and the most compulsive influence in reaching

decision is that of the environment in which they work. I doubt that any
advocate or judge could find so many values in any other book available.
In addition to the masterful probing of the author, the reader will be forced
to do some hard thinking for himself, and therein lie additional values without
limit. At times he may feel that the author in seeking the judges' lair has

lost himself in the jungle, but if he sticks with him he'll bag big game.
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While stare decisis should not, and seldom does play any great
part in the decision of a case against what a court considers a just
result, it does serve a great function in stabilizing the litigation
process and in guarding it against ad hoc improvising. It is also
an excellent terminal argument. Advocates sensing an adverse decision find it hard to let go. The simple announcement by a judge:
"Counsel, I sympathize with your point of view. If I were free
your argument would be very persuasive, but fortunately or unfortunately, as I see the law, it is settled against your client." What
else is there to say? Thus it is that stare decisis is a time-saving device
and gives finality without offense. Likewise, it is an escape of the
harried trial judge from examining too extensively questions which
he thinks the appellate courts should consider. Also, it may postpone the evil day when an appellate court must face up to the reexamination of some obsolescent rule. Even so, I doubt that it
often controls decision if the court is convinced that justice is opposed to precedent, and if the advocate opens some way to by-pass
it. Even in cases where the holdings of former cases may be doubtful
a court may well hesitate to make a departure that is equally doubtful. It would seem in the overwhelming number of cases in which
stare decisis has been stressed by a court that it is employed as an
argument to support the correctness of the decision made by the
court rather than to compel a decision the court would not otherwise have reached. However often the courts may indicate their
unwillingness to make a departure because forbidden by stare decisis
their motivations usually lie elsewhere. As an escape from all
manner of embarrassments neither the courts nor the practitioner
could afford to renounce the doctrine. It is the backbone of the
adversary process and when faced with threat of utter rout is available for either attack or retreat.
The supports of stability and justice and also the controls of
the judicial development of tort law are to be found in more dependable factors than the doctrine of stare decisis. They are to be
found: (1) in the structure and personnel of the court system; (2)
in the language of the law; and (3) in the environmental factors
that influence judgment.
STRUCTURE AND PERSONNEL OF A COURT SYSTEM

The structure of the court systems of nearly all jurisdictions
is now compact and integrated. Trial courts and intermediate appellate courts are under considerable supervision by the highest ap-
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pellate courts. The procedural rule-making power does much to
make this supervision effective. In jurisdictions which have administrative personnel charged with keeping track of the work of all the
courts and their operations the supervisory function of the highest
court is made more effective. Judicial councils and conferences of
judges afford forums for the discussion of procedural problems and
to some degree troublesome problems of substantive law. Bar association sections in some jurisdictions devote their studies to the
operations of the courts. The results are that both courts and
practitioners are sensitive to any tensions or failures to function at
any point in the court structure, and they receive the attention of
those who have the responsibility of dealing with them. As a wellarticulated court structure facilitates the decisional supervision of the
highest court, this in turn enables and encourages advocates to raise
and have considered problems of substantive law which they would
otherwise hesitate to raise. The stability and the growth of law are
served.
The personnel of the courts is a great factor both in the stability
and in the development of law. Many lawyers who reach the bench
have already passed the growth meridian. Their attitudes and ideas
have jelled and they are happy to live within their limitations which
fortunately will accommodate most of the problems which come
before them in the course of their brief tenures. Others enter upon
their judgeships with hopes of leaving the law enriched through their
efforts. The resistance of fellow judges and the drags of obsolescence
and heavy dockets wear most of them down rather quickly and their
urge for the improvement of decisional law is greatly reduced or
lost altogether. The few judges who never lose their edge may at
times upset their brethren and the profession but it is they who
eventually are honored as the great judges of their day.
This much also must be said. Judges, however great their
power, are not always free to decide a case justly or even as they
think justly. They are held under restraints by the attitudes of their
fellow judges, the legal profession, and their lay constituents. They
are under strong compulsions to satisfy both doctrinal restraints and
the notions of justice held by those they serve. They are under the
pressures of their environment as are we all and only by great efforts
and great courage can they modify or surmount their environment
or even respond to the environmental changes about them. Assume
that a judge comes to his office with a minimum of intellectual
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shackles, he must make commitments in the decision of every case
in which he participates and in every opinion he writes. In a relatively short time he has encased himself in a prison of ideas and
tenets from which escape is difficult. He may recognize that consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds but he also recognizes that
inconsistency in a judge quickly undermines his stature with fellow
judges and the profession. I know of no better example of some
of these observations than Mr. Justice Holmes whom we regard as
about as free a judge intellectually as ever sat on a court. His
ideas of tort law were formed early in his life by his great scholarship
and writing of the classic, The Common Law. This was at a time
when a new environment was moving in to challenge the validity
of the common law he wrote. He could never escape his early commitments and some of his decisions in tort cases were museum
pieces by the time they were written.2 His freedom was limited to
new areas which developed later in his life.
All in all the greatest insurance that tort law will accommodate
itself to the environment is the constant turnover and replacement
in personnel of the courts and of the profession-new judges and
new advocates fresh from the maelstrom of daily affairs, and charged
with the same impulses that give the environment its motion. Fortunately, there are no breaks in this chain of replacements. It
keeps moving endlessly from year to year bringing recruits to reinforce and shortly take over the processes of litigation through which
tort law is refashioned. It is this renewal of personnel that provides
stability and dependability of law by giving to it the rhythm of
the environment it serves and of which it is a part.
It is here that law schools have become so important in shaping
the law of the future. I do not think anyone can exaggerate the
influence the law schools have had on the great development of tort
law in this century. They too are a part of the environment and
daily sit in judgment on the courts. However much the judges may
discount the criticisms of professors and students, they prefer to
have their approval. But the reactions of the judges to the law school
are not nearly so important to the progress of the law as is the fact
21 District v. Inhabitants of Northampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884); Holbrook
v. Aldrich, 168 Mass. 15 (1898); Chenery v. Fitchburg R.R., 160 Mass. 211,
35 N.E. 554 (1893); United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258 U.S. 268
(1922); Kawananakoa v. Polybrook, 205 U.S. 349 (1907); Baltimore &
O.R.R. v. Goodman, 275 U.S. 66, (1927); Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co.
v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927).
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that very quickly they will be supplanted by the law students of
today, and the more rapidly this takes place the more quickly will
tort and other law respond to the environmental needs. Thus the
great necessity that law teachers never allow themselves to grow
stale or obsolescent and that law students never close their hearts
and minds against the creative processes of the law. The saddest
teaching experience I have is to realize that some young fellow
leaves my class still dead in the head. My hope is that some other
teacher may succeed where I failed, for it is the highest tragedy
for a young lawyer to begin his professional life already intellectually
petrified, and a public calamity for him later to be elevated to the
bench.
THE LAW'S LANGUAGE

Another source of great stability and growth of tort law is
found in its language-the medium of communication which has
been developed for dealing with its problems. Inasmuch as tort law
is largely litigation law, its vocabulary and grammar are designed
for adversary purposes. Its concepts are numerous and its theories,
doctrines, principles, rules, and formulas are broad in scope and
extended in reach. I could not present a comprehensive and adequate picture of the language of tort law and the functions it serves
even if I had the time, but I desire to make some observations
which will indicate its stabilizing value.
Any important term of tort law such as assault, trespass, false
imprisonment, negligence, nuisance, deceit, intent, unlawful, accident,
duty, causation, foreseeability, reasonableness, proximate, probable,
remote, and scores of other terms is a complex concept. These
concepts have grown more complex in meaning and usage with the
years as new problems requiring their use have arisen. Each term
is exceedingly flexible, capable of accommodating many shades of
meaning. Moreover, each term has associated with it modifying
refinements which may limit or expand its coverage and usage.
It is not a language of precision but rather one of ambiguitystrikingly like the language of diplomacy-always requiring the judgment of some one to make it explicit. Thus it is a language for
adversaries-language that gives the judge a wide latitude for judgment. It forecloses nothing until it is employed by the judge to
indicate his decision. It can thus accommodate an infinite number
of cases and at the same time permits advocate, judge, and jury to
look through its transparent texture and view the factual data beneath with a minimum of obstruction. This transparency of language

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1962

15

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 2 [1962], Art. 2
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 64

permits the consideration of each case on its factual merits if the
language is used intelligently. At the same time, it is automatically
geared to the environment through those who argue and who give
judgment. The language of tort law, as is the case with other language, may and does suffer from misuse and may also be employed
abortively. More frequently than not the battles over principles
and precedents are nothing more than disagreements over the use
of language. For as often as we tell ourselves that the facts of a
case should dominate decision, language pushes itself to the forefront
and, if it has become crystallized in the minds of advocate or judge,
blurs the image of the facts. The efforts to freeze the language of
tort law into definite molds impairs its usefulness though it will not
remain frozen. Its flexibility, though impaired for the moment, is
indestructible however much it may be abused in the particular case.
Even the least sensitive judge who may insist that language compels
decision senses that it is the problem raised by the facts before him
on which he must pass judgment. Thus it is that stability of law
and justice are served by language that permits and requires judgment on the merits of a case as disclosed by the particular facts.
So far I have been speaking of the internal composition of
the judicial process and its built-in restraints on judicial law-making.
Let us now consider the influences from without that control lawmaking by the courts. These influences may be identified as (1)
the moral climate, (2) the economic climate, and (3) balancing
danger and liability.
(1)

The Moral Climate
The moral climate of the environment is vastly more comprehensive than the coverage of tort law.22 Tort law is identified with
morality only in so far as tort law is operative. If a person by his
conduct has created some risk or has assumed some relation to
some other person, then tort law comes into play, but not until
then.2 As we have stated earlier, tort law is based fundamentally
22 See Probert, Speaking of Torts, 49 Ky. LJ. 114 (1960) for excellent
discussion of language usage. The problem of language has interested me for
many years, see GREEN, JUGE AND JuRy 43 et. seq. (1930); The Study and
Teaching of Tort Law, 34 TEXAS L. Rnv. 1 (1957).
23 Depue v. Flateau, 100 Minn. 299, 111 N.W. 1 (1907); Tuligren v.
Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 82 N.H. 268, 133 Atl. 4, 46 A.L.R. 80 (1926); Dubuca
v. La Salle, 94 So.2d 120 (La. App. 1957). Some courts have too severely
restricted affirmative conduct. See Union Pac. Ry. v. Cappier, 66 Kan. 649,
72 Pac. 281 (1903); Osterland v. Hall, 263 Mass. 73, 160 N.E. 301, 56
A.L.R. 1123 (1928); Gregory, Gratuitous Undertaking and The Duty of Care,
1 DE PAUL L. REv. 30 (1951); Comment, 52 COLuM. L. RLnv. 631 (1952).
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on the moral concept of recompense or reparation for harm done
whether inflicted unlawfully, intentionally, negligently, accidentally,
or innocently. Its very language is a moral absorbent. The terms
tort, injury, wrong, unlawfulness, trespass, intent, care, fault, duty,
blame, violation of duty, deceit, fraud, slander, negligence, damage,
and many other of its terms were taken out of the moral vocabulary
and made to do service for tort law. Wherever a court has insisted
upon a distinction of tort and morality, it has always been a compromise of morality with some competitive concept. It must be
remembered, of course, that morality also takes its color from the
environment as does tort law, that each is in constant process of
reflecting environment undergoing ceaseless change, and further, that
neither can be imprisoned by formula or definition except in the
most flexible terms. One is found in the daily lives of men and
the other in the administration of law by men. Discover one and
the chances are the other is nearby. Each must have environmental
support and where support is weak, both tort law and morality are
weak. The most we can say is that tort law strives to be moral
and in absence of serious administrative and economic considerations
usually is moral. Thus we accept morality as a factor that greatly
influences all tort law and as one of the most reliable controls of
court-made law-a control from within and from without that pervades all other controls but which can seldom be identified separately
from them.
(2)

The Economic Climate

The last observation is confirmed in the assessment of the influence of the economic climate on tort law. The economic climate
was the predominant influence in the development of tort law
throughout the 1800's. Its influence reduced liability under tort law
from the high moral plane that required one who hurt another to
compensate him for his injury, to the level that one who hurts another unintentionally was not liable to him at all except in the most
restricted sense. And even if the hurt were intended, many escapes
from liability were made available. What is good economically for
the individual is usually justified by him as morally sound. Likewise,
what is considered good economically for the group usually determines the moral climate of the environment. When the good of the
individual conflicts with the good of the group, the group prevails.
During the 1800's, when both individuals and the group were wholeheartedly in pursuit of this world's goods, morals and even religion
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frequently accommodated themselves with the utmost fidelity to
the sacrifice of industrial employees for profit, to the acquisition of
wealth by fraudulent means and the exploitation of human beings,
especially children and recent immigrants, through slave wages and
even slavery itself. The tort doctrines of negligence and deceit were
weighted heavily against the victims through defensive doctrines and
immunities based on the economic good of the group disguised by
a thin veneer of moral terminology. On the other hand, when wealth
and the economic security of many individuals and of the group
generally had been achieved, the same doctrinal immunities began to
be rejected and the rules of negligence and deceit law have been
re-weighted and given a fresh moral coating and the victims of
tortious conduct are receiving much greater consideration. Morality
is servile under economic stress and so is tort law. In turn, a secure
economic order may be served by a resurgent morality, and when
that is true, tort law is likewise resurgent. This has been true in
the environmental period of the last decade or so. When it became
clear that enterprise could fend against liability for the tortious conduct of its agents and employees through various means of distributing its losses, morality gave its support and tort law extended its
protection accordingly. In fact, it has come to be realized that the
ability to distribute the losses of enterprise through prices and/or
insurance may well add greatly to the economic good of the group
as well as to the good of the victims of enterprise. People generally,
as well as judges and juries, develop a keen sensitivity for the unfortunate victims of the dangers of a mechanized industrial and
social order and provision for their care against physical hurts becomes only a phase of the general desire to make provision for the
hazards of unemployment, old age, disease, and poverty.2 4 It can
always be said that a society's economy holds a heavy hand over
tort law.
(3)

Balancing Danger and Liability

The protective or preventive power of courts through tort law
has grown to be very great. Whether the court finds its power and
the impulse to use it in the economic good, in morality, or whether
its power and impulse are but a composite of all the influences of
the environment subsumed under the concept of justice, is not too
24 How

the concepts of justice, morals and law fade into or rather absorb

each other is deftly and delightfully considered by Professor Edmond Cahn

in his two small volumes, The Moral Decision (1955) and The Sense of
Injustice (1949).
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important. Courts do exercise their protective power in tort law
through both legal and equitable remedies to balance liability against
danger. Late in the 1800's the court exercised this power by way
of damages imposed in behalf of a mine owner whose mine was
destroyed by the escape of water collected on the surface by a
mill owner. 5 Against this danger the mine owner could provide no
possible protection for his mine. From this reversion to medieval
law the courts of many jurisdictions have come to impose liability
for injury inflicted by any hazardous undertaking on neighboring
premises.26 The doctrine is characterized as strict liability, and its
rationalization is that anyone who engages in an enterprise against
whose dangers he affords no protection, and against which the victim
can provide no protection, is liable for the injuries done the victim.
The doctrine has many limitations but is now accepted in many types
of cases. More frequently, perhaps, the doctrine invoked is nuisance
and the courts have exercised their equitable jurisdiction in either
preventing altogether or greatly minimizing the risks and possible
injury. Injunction, partial restraint, damages, or any combinati6n of
remedies may be utilized and time may be given to permit the parties
to work out some solution which will allow the operation of an
enterprise without too serious injury to it or its victims.2" Also,
very recently what was considered the closed concept of trespass has
been expanded to include the use of modem forms of destructive
force which would not have fallen within the orthodox concept.28
If the courts can give trespass new dimensions it is not difficult to
believe that they can expand the less refractory doctrines of tort
law. And we do not have to make any wide search for instances
in which they have done this very thing, as I have previously indicated by their extension of the doctrines of negligence, deceit and
warranty, and by removing the restrictions and limitations earlier
imposed on those doctrines.
25 Fletcher v. Rylands, L. R. Q. Exch. 265 (1866), Rylands v. Fletcher,
L. R.26 3 H. L. 830 (1868).
Green v. General Petroleum Corp., 205 Cal. 328, 270 Pac. 952, 60
A.L.R. 475 (1928); Bedell v. Goulter, 199 Ore. 344, 261 P.2d 842 (1953);
Green, Hazardous Oil and Gas Operations: Tort Liability, 33 TExAs L. REV.
575 (1955); Gregory, Trespass to Negligence to Absolute Liability, 37 VA. L.
REv. 359 (1951); Morris, Hazardous Enterprises and Risk Bearing Capacity,
61 YALE L. 1172 (1952); Keeton, Trespass, Nuisance and Strict Liability,
59 COLUM. L. REv. 457 (1959); Donley, Some Aspects of Tort Liability in
the Mining of Coal, 61 W. VA. L. REv. 243 (1959).
27 City of Harrisonville v. W. S. Dickey Clay Co., 289 U.S. 334 (1933);
Hannum
v. Gruber, 346 Pa. 417, 31 A.2d 99 (1943).
28
Martin v. Reynolds Metal Co., 221 Ore. 86, 342 P.2d 790 (1959); cf.,
Reynolds v. Yturbide, 258 F.2d (9th Cir. 1958).
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Two EXAmPLES
Your studies will confirm some of the statements I have made,
others you may accept on faith, but there are some about which
you may have great doubts. It would have been much more enlightening to you and satisfying to me to have supported each
statement with a vivid example. To have done so would have
required almost complete coverage of a course in torts. But I do not
want to leave you without support for some of the more basic
assertions I have ventured. For this purpose I choose two examples
-widely different, but important.
(1)

Court Control of Jury Trial

One of the neatest and least noted areas of making law by
the American courts is found in the substantive devices by which
they have come to control jury trial, especially in negligence cases,
though not restricted to them. In most jurisdictions the common law
power to comment on the weight of the evidence has been forbidden the trial judge by statute. The orthodox common-law method
for submitting the negligence issue to a jury is by the use of the
foreseeability formula; namely, whether as a result of his conduct
the defendant should, under all the circumstances, have reasonably
foreseen some harm to the plaintiff or someone so situated, and
whether he exercised the care of an ordinarily prudent person to
avoid hurting the plaintiff. This is an exceedingly comprehensive
formula and once submitted leaves most of the power of judgment
in a negligence case to a jury. By orthodox common law the judge
could take up every phase of this formula, state the evidence as
it bore on the particular facet of the formula, and advise the jury
of the court's opinion as to the weight to be given the evidence, so
long as the jury was left free to find the ultimate issue. The American
judges in most states have been denied this power. But the courts
found a way to avoid this limitation on their power.
The first step was the full exercise of their power to say there
was no evidence raising the issue, or that it was so flimsy as to be
insufficient to support a verdict, or so weighty as to require a directed verdict. This exercise of power was not unorthodox, for
courts have exercised it time out of mind. But the American courts
exploited this power to weigh the facts by the use of inferences,
presumptions, prima facie case, negligence per se, res ipsa loquitur,
burden of proceeding, and burden of proof. Each of these terms
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raises a question of law and therefore is subject to the court's instructions.
Moreover, the courts came to look further into the "circumstances" surrounding the defendant's conduct and discovered what
are called independent intervening, or independent supervening, or
dependent intervening, or dependent supervening causes and to instruct on them wherever found. Likewise, they may discover circumstances that suggest unavoidable accident, sudden emergency, or
sole proximate cause and instruct on them. In other words, by
this method the courts may convert particular fact circumstances
into questions of law on which they instruct and thereby exert control over the jury's verdict. Suffice it to say that the exploitation
of this power through instructions on facts converted into points
of law serves all the purposes indirectly that the power to comment
on the evidence can serve directly. The only difference is the pompousness of the instructions, the fractionalizing of the ultimate issue,
and the confusion produced by so many and such metaphysical
doctrinal refinements. 9
These maneuvers were not the inventions of the trial courts
but primarily the inventions of advocates which were approved by
the appellate courts who found in them the power to control both
trial judge and jury, for these instructions open for review the whole
trial process by virtue of the exceptions taken to the giving, or the
refusal to give, instructions on the evidentiary circumstances raised
to the level of points of law. How completely the appellate courts
have brought jury trial under their control by this type of strategy
can only be determined by the close study of a particular jurisdiction, for there are numerous variations in the tactics employed from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction in the submission of negligence and other
issues.
(2) Railway v. Stout
For a second example I choose what on its face is one of the
simplest cases in all tort law °--a case that a person who had
29 See Werkman v. Howard Zinc Corp., 97 Cal. App. 2d 43, 218 P.2d
43 (1958), one of numerous cases indicating how the courts have come to
load the submission process with purely fact considerations which they have
converted into questions of law. Notice how the Torts Restatement supports
this method of jury trial control by the courts. Better methods of control
can be found than this cluttering of instructions, opinions, and law books
issues and highly confusing statements.
with 3false
0
SiouX City & P. R.R. v. Stout, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 657 (1873).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1962

21

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 64, Iss. 2 [1962], Art. 2
[ Vol. 64
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

never heard the word "tort" could decide without hesitation-and
yet which proved to be the most explosive decision of the nineteenth
century, challenged and fought over in every court of the country
for a period of seventy-five years and now, while generally accepted,
is still being limited or expanded in numerous cases by many courts.
A six-year old boy named Stout, who lived in a small frontier
Nebraska hamlet, went with some other boys a little older to ride
on the turntable of defendant railroad which had only recently extended to that point. The turntable lock was out of order and some
of the boys could turn it while the others rode. Employees of the
railroad had seen boys playing on the turntable previously. On
this occasion, young Stout's foot was caught and crushed while he
was attempting to mount the turntable. He sued the railroad for
damages on account of its negligence in leaving such a dangerous
machine open to children, and recovered judgment. The main defense was that the railroad was not negligent and that Stout's injury
was an accident. The jury found otherwise. It was agreed that
Stout was too young to be contributorily negligent. That Stout was
a trespasser on the railroad's premises was brushed aside by the
court on the basis of several earlier decisions which bore slight
analogy to Stout's case.
The profession tabbed the decision as the "turntable" doctrine
and rejected it as a repudiation of the doctrine that a landowner
owes a trespasser no duty except not intentionally to hurt him; a
doctrine that the courts had created and on which they had relied
time out of mind. Only a few courts accepted the decision on the
basis of simple negligence employed by the Supreme Court of the
United States, but many courts reached the same conclusion on one
or another of six or seven other doctrines created on the spot to
support the decision, all of which involved fictions varying from a
trap at one extreme, to that of an invited guest at the other extreme.' 1
Courts deeply schooled in the common law, such as those of Massachusetts, New York, and Peunsylvania, treated the decision with
contempt, and such scholarly judges and professors as Jeremiah
Smith and32Oliver Wendell Holmes rejected the doctrine in the strongest terms.
3Bottums' Adm'r. v. Hawks, 84 Vt. 370, 78 At. 858 (1911); Wadell
v. New River Co., 141 W. Va. 880, 93 S.E.2d 473 (1956).
32 Smith, Liability of Landowners to Children Entering Without Permission, 11 HAv. L. REv. 349, 434 (1898); Chenery v. Fitchburg R.R., 160
Mass. 211, 35 N.E. 554 (1893); United Zinc & Chemical Co. v. Britt, 258
U.S. 268 (1922).
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Let us consider briefly what was involved. On the one side
was the deeply revered rule of the common law that had for centuries
protected English landed estates, earlier from enemies and latterly
from poachers. The rule was suited to the English environment.
On the other side was a small frontier community where land
boundaries were unknown except to a surveyor. Any person could
travel or hunt anywhere in the wide open spaces without anyone's
permission. Except for a few widely separated farms, there were
no fences, no keep-out signs, nothing but prairies where cattlemen,
their cattle and the Indians still roamed. The boys were few in
number and had no playgrounds, no little red wagons, no bicycles,
no baseball, no football, no movies, no hills for slides, no sapling
to bend over and ride, no swimming holes away from a treacherous
river. What could they do to have fun? They could play leap frog,
stink base if they could find an old sock to unravel for a yarn ball;
they could wrestle, jump, play hide and seek, and roam. Walking
the rails and counting the ties of the new railroad gave their play
a new dimension, and when they took possession of the turntable
it was doubtless the most joyful discovery of their lives.
The estate involved was lately public domain, now donated to
a railroad company, but still unfenced. What harm could these boys
do to the rails and the turntable? The railroad had no interest in
keeping anyone off its premises. In wet weather the track was the
smoothest and driest way in the community and everybody made
use of it.
Can you imagine two environments further removed-the landed
English estate guarded against poachers and this hamlet community
so recently a terminus of a continental railway on its way to the
Pacific? What kinship did this landowner have with land kept for
rabbit warrens and the refuge of wild game for the sport of the
nobleman and his guests? Here was land devoted to and activated
by the most dangerous machinery of the times, left open to anyone
who might come upon it-the certain rendezvous of small boys
seeking adventure.
Here then was the setting for the declaration of a new principle
as valid in its day as the trespasser rule was for the English estate.
But it required more than half a century for the doctrine to be
acceptably formulated by a group of law professors under cover of
the Restatement, and then another quarter of a century to find ac-
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ceptance by the courts and the profession.33 This is the story in
slender outline. If it could be followed through from case to case
with all the scholarly fulminations, table-pounding, crafty arguments,
solemn pronouncements, and melodramatic by-play, no one would
be left in doubt that courts fabricate law in all the patterns in
which words can be arranged to accommodate the ends that courts
deem just; that stare decisis is an argument, not a commandment;
that its chief value lies in its creativeness in support of the stability
of the social order; that most tort problems involve details in profusion and variety beyond the reach of the blunt provisions of
general rules or statutes; that law cannot advance beyond the understanding and courage of advocates and judges and their capacity
to recharge its language with new thought and meaning; and that
the making, unmaking, modification and shaping of law to the case
in hand is serious business largely controlled by the moral and
economic climates and the dangers of the environment as they are
brought to bear on the litigation process by the march of time.
SUMMATION

By way of summation of this discussion permit me to restate
the basic considerations that underlie the making of law by courts.
As a separate and equal department of government the courts are
established to hear and determine the claims or controversies brought
to them through the litigation process within the limits of their
jurisdictional powers. If the case is governed by constitutional or
statutory provision it is the function of the court to construe and
give meaning to the provision in adjudicating the claim. It is rare
indeed that a provision of constitution or statute is so explicit that
it does not require construction or interpretation.34 The very necessity of interpretation gives the courts power to determine its ap33 Angelier v. Red Star Yeast & Products Co., 215 Wis. 47, 254 N.W. 351
(1934); Mayer v. Temple Properties, 307 N.Y. 559, 122 N.E.2d 909 (1954);
see Carradine v. City of New York, 209 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1960) for series of

cases indicating how gradually the New York courts came to accept the

doctrine and how they still make many nice distinctions which serve to deny
liability in the particular case; Green, Landowners Responsibility to Children,
27 TExAs L. Rv. 1 (1948); Shanks v. Peabody Co-op Equity Exchange, 352
P.2d 41 (Kan. 1960); Brock v. Peabody Co-op Equity Exchange, 352 P.2d
39 (Kan.
1960).
34
See the excellent discussion of my colleague, Professor Joseph P.
Witherspoon, Administrative Discretion to Determine Statutory Meaning: The

High Road, 35 TExAs L. Rlv. 62 (1956); The Low Road (pts. 1-2), 38
TEXAs L. RBv. 392, 572 (1960).
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plication to the particular case, and as other claims require adjudication it is inevitable that construction be broadened or modified to
meet the peculiar facts of the case. Thus, in time, any important
provision of constitution or statute is so greatly glossed by construction or interpretation that it becomes a product of court-made law
and its form and content either lose much of their original vitality
or else are so transformed by the courts' creativeness as to fall
within the domain of decisional or judge-made law.
This process of law making is different from what is known as
common law only in the fact that the common law is usually developed from the adjudication of a case without aid of constitution
or statute. The courts, through the assistance of advocates, find
in the great fund of wisdom common to all mankind, as constantly
replenished by the experience and decisions of the courts themselves,
some policy, principle, theory, doctrine, rule, or formula that is
thought to control the determination of the case. In making this
determination, the policy, principle, theory, doctrine, rule, or formula
is stated as the basis of decision. This formulation is available for future cases in the same way as a decision based on constitutional or statutory provision. And with the coming of new
cases it will be glossed, extended, or modified so as to accommodate
the particular case. Over the years, with hundreds of courts making
decisions made available by published reports, the mass of decisional
law with its restatements, commentaries, texts, encyclopedias and
search books becomes so massive as to require great expansion of
professional services and expenditures.
As the courts face thousands of new cases every year, the labor
involved in focusing on any particular case the teachings of relevant
decisions and the wisdom reflected by critics and commentators becomes more and more a hopeless undertaking however industrious
the advocates, the judges, and their research assistants may be.
How do we meet such a situation? It is my thesis that we meet it
in the only practical way. We focus on the particular case in its
particular setting. The function of the court with its adversary
process of litigation is to settle the case justly between the parties
with due consideration of the interests and affairs of the rest of us
who may be affected by the decision, and also with due consideration
of the burdens and problems it may create for the courts themselves
in subsequent litigation. Advocates support their respective claims
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with such facts as they can produce by way of proof and by such
arguments as they can draw from former decisions and any other
source of wisdom they find available. The judges are trained and
experienced in the processes of litigation. They draw on all they
know and all that may be presented to them. They usually have a
wide choice of principles, theories, doctrines, and rules to guide
and influence them, and under the controls which their environment
has on their thought and action they make their decision. Having
made decision, no court is so lacking in ability that it cannot rationalize what it has done in terms of law and justice, at least to its
own satisfaction.
There is nothing mysterious about this process. It only becomes
mysterious when we attempt to reduce it to mechanical or metaphysical analysis or logic such as discovering the ratio decedendi,
or when we as commentators or critics re-try the case on the basis
of our own judgment of the facts and choice of law to reach the
ends we would serve. We measure the court's product by the imagined product we should have preferred and may immediately raise
a clamor that the court is in error or has departed from the sacred
doctrine of stare decisis.
The responsibility of fashioning law for adjusting the claims
which arise out of the myriad activities of the everyday life of a
people was given to the courts by our forebears some centuries ago
and on the basis of a long history we have no regrets. Their power
was not expended by their first nor their last decision. If a court
is convinced that justice calls for a pattern of decision different from
some decision made by it or some other court under somewhat
similar facts at a different period of time, it has the responsibility
to do justice in the case before it, and if need be, rectify its formulation of law. No society could long endure under law that could not
be made to respond to the needs of its members. A court's limitations are largely those that it imposes on itself. And, if any American
court should seek to bind itself by a rule that would prevent the
correction of its errors or the advance of the cause of justice beyond
its former decisions, it would be held in contempt by every other
court and every informed citizen in the country. Not since Littleton
has any responsible law-giver seriously insisted that "what never was,
never never should be," and the doctrine of stare decisis bears no
such implication. With constant change in physical and social environments, and replacements in the personnel of lawyers, judges,
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and jurors-an endless procession-the development of tort law is
assured. The lawyer who does not learn to accommodate his stride
to the law's movement will live a frustrated and an unhappy life.
(Part III of this article will appear in the April issue.)
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